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criticism," and possibly the court in the instant case, by deciding that the
contractor had no property interest in the funds, has found a loophole to
avoid the harsh application of this doctrine.
THEODORE C. REGNANTE
Judgments—Collateral Estoppel Used Defensively by One Not a Party,
or in Privity with Party, to Former Action.—Emil Eisel v. Columbia
Packing Co.'—A products liability action was brought in the Federal Dis-
trict Court in Massachusetts by a Connecticut consumer of ham against the
packer, a Massachusetts corporation. In a previous action brought by the
consumer in the state courts of Connecticut both the retailer and packer had
been named as parties defendant. On motion by the packer, he had been
dropped as a party defendant, the action thereafter being prosecuted only
against the retailer. Judgment was had by the retailer on a finding that the
consumer's injuries did not result from any defective condition of the ham.
The packer, relying on the prior adjudication, moved for judgment in the
present action, contending that the consumer was collaterally estopped from
maintaining the suit. HELD: the plaintiff having had full opportunity to liti-
gate his claim against the retailer, and having been unsuccessful for reasons
unrelated to any personal defense of the retailer, is precluded from relitigating
the same issue against the packer. While every man is entitled to his day
in court there is no persuasive public policy allowing the relitigation of a
claim when the issue has been fully tried in substantially the same context
in a prior suit. Where the successful prosecution of a suit against a retailer
would permit of the defendant's indemnification by the manufacturer, uni-
lateral estoppel precludes the unsuccessful plaintiff from subsequently suing
the manufacturer on substantially the same issue, the policy of the doctrine
of res judicata being that there should be an end to litigation.
The plea of res judicata is available when the parties and issues in a
prior case are identical to those presently before the court.2 In such case
each of the parties is estopped from setting up his claim or defense against
the other, there being, consequently, a mutuality of estoppel. However,
where a party has several claims against two or more persons, he may
pursue his remedy against each separately (absent procedural rules requiring
joinder) and he is not precluded by a failure of successful prosecution
against one, from thereafter pursuing his claim against the other. But a
judgment for a defendant will not be conclusive against the plaintiff in a
subsequent action brought by him against a new defendant, unless a favor-
able judgment for the plaintiff in the first case would have either permitted
16 macLachlan, Improving the Laws of Federal Liens and Priority, 1 B. C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 73 (1959). Kennedy, The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General
Liens, 63 Yale L.J. 905 (1954).
1 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960).
2 Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89
N.E. 193 (1909), aff'd, 225 U.S. 111 (1911).
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him to have based his action on such judgment in the second case against
the new defendant, or have permitted him to have based his defense on such
judgment if suit had been brought against him in the second case. Con-
versely, no party to present litigation can claim the benefit of a prior judg-
ment secured by a third party against his present opponent, unless a prior
judgment secured by his present opponent against such third party could
have been used against him .5
Conflicting with this view is the principle that once a party has litigated
an issue, he should be precluded from relitigating it, even against a stranger.4
Thus, exceptions to the doctrine of no res judicata where no privity of
parties to the litigation, or no mutuality of estoppel, appear in cases in-
volving successive suits against servant and master, agent and principal, and
possibly in other situations involving comparable relationships. 5
 Justification
for these exceptions is based on the undesirability of exposing to a judicial
determination of liability a person whose legal accountability arises as a
result of the actions or inactions of another, after the actor has been judi-
cially exonerated of liability as a result of a suit brought by the present
plaintiff.
A growing minority of jurisdictions has extended the exception beyond
these relationships on the ground that a plaintiff, having chosen his ad-
versary and forum, should not be allowed as a matter of public policy to
relitigate the same substantive claim unsuccessfully prosecuted by him
initially 6
The same result is had where the first suit is brought against the actor's
principal and unsucessfully prosecuted because of failure to establish the
actor's legal liability, and subsequently the same plaintiff seeks to establish,
a second time, the legal liability of the actor, in a suit brought against the
latter.
It appears from these decisions that three requirements must be met
before the exception will be invoked; (1), the substantive issue in the prior
litigation must be identical to that in the second case, (2), the prior judg-
ment must have been on the merits, and (3), the party the plaintiff against
whom the prior judgment is sought to be asserted as a defense must have
been a party to the prior litigation.? Thus it is apparent that the development
in the law is away from formalism where such prevents the achievement of
a fair and desirable result.
3 Polasky, Collateral Estoppel—Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 Iowa L. Rev. 217,
241 (1954).
4 Jenkins v. Atlantic Coast Line, 89 S.C. 408, 412, 7 S.E. 1010, 1012 (1888).
5 Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.
1901); Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 179 N.E. 246 (1931); Emery v. Fowler,
39 Me. 326 (1855).
Coca Cola v. Pepsi Cola, 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1934); Bruzewski
v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal.
App. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); Good Health Products Corp. v. Emery, 215 N.Y. 14,
9 N.E.2d 758 (1937).
7 Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra note 6.
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It is suggested that by casting aside the requirement of mutuality of
estoppel a party should be allowed to plead affirmatively a judgment against
one not in privity with a party to the first action. 8 However, in practice the
courts have generally not gone this far, only one case having been found
which permitted the prior judgment to be used affirmatively.° The courts
are understandably reluctant to extend the doctrine beyond the defensive use
of the prior judgment against a plaintiff, because of the possibility of undue
hardship or injustice if a second plaintiff should be permitted to rely on the
first plaintiff's prior judgment against a defendant, as a basis for judgment
in the second proceeding.
The same cannot be said for cases like the present,I 8 where the major
issue in the successive trials was identical, a close legal relationship existed
between the three parties involved—a consumer, the retailer from whom he
purchased and the packer from whom the retailer received the merchandise.
If the consumer could not prove as against the retailer that the purchased
item was defective there is no great injustice in saying that he should not
be given a second chance to prove it against the packer.
Thus it is felt that the court in the instant case has followed the modern
trend that has reached the limit to which the judiciary will extend the rule
that mutuality of estoppel is necessary for the application of the doctrine
of res judicata.
ARTHUR J. CARON, JR.
Labor Law—Picketing for Union Shop when No Dispute Exists Between
Employer and Employees.—Messner v. Journeymen Barbers.'—Defend-
ant union submitted a contract to the plaintiff that would have required
both plaintiff and his employees (barbers) to join defendant's organization.
The union did not represent any of the plaintiff's employees, and the em-
8 Polasky, supra note 3, at 247; Comment, 35 Yale L.I. 607 (1926); Note, 57
Harv. L. Rev. 98, 104 (1943). Cf. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957). Such a case would arise where
a railroad accident is caused by the alleged negligence of the carrier. After passenger
A is successful in maintaining his action against the carrier can passenger B introduce
A's judgment to conclusively establish the carrier's liability for the accident leaving B
to his proof only of the connection between the accident and his injury and the extent
and monetary value of his damages? A second situation could arise where an auto-
mobile accident involves driver A, driver B and passenger C in B's car. A's suit against
B results in judgment for B based on a finding of A's contributory negligence. Can
passenger C in a suit against A rely on B's judgment to establish A's negligence?
9 Voss Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pike, 350 Ill. App. 528, 113 N.E.2d 202 (1953).
to Seavey, Development in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818 (1952).
While, as the court points out, Professor Seavey is apparently not sympathetic to the
application of the doctrine of res judicata in situations where there is an absence of
mutuality of estoppel, he does state: "Perhaps a fair limit would allow strangers to use
prior judgments defensively, at least against the plaintiff in the prior action, not affirm-
atively." Ibid. 863.
1 4 Cal. Rptr. 179, 351 P.2d 347 (1960).
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